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Abstract
This paper investigates the impacts of capital mobility and tax competition in a setting with
imperfect matching between ﬁrms and workers. The small country attracts less ﬁrms than the
large one but accommodates a share of the industry that exceeds its capital share - a reverse
home market eﬀect. This allows the small country to be more aggressive and to set a higher tax
rate than the large one, thus implying that tax competition reduces international inequalities.
However, the large country always attains a higher utility than does the small country. Our
model thus encapsulates both the “importance of being small” and the “importance of being
large”. Last, tax harmonization beneﬁts to the small country but is detrimental to the large one.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last two decades, OECD countries have experienced very high increases in foreign direct
investments (OECD, 2003). As economic integration gets deeper, these investments are likely to
become more responsive to diﬀerentials in corporate tax rates. The empirical evidence collected by
Mooij and Ederveen (2003) conﬁrms the idea that governments vastly use such an instrument to
inﬂuence ﬁrms’ locational choices. Building on that observation, the literature on ﬁscal competition
studies how governments choose their tax rates in order to attract ﬁrms (Wilson, 1999). Because
the outcome of ﬁscal competition crucially hinges on the international mobility of capital, it seems
promising and reasonable to build on the microeconomic underpinnings of ﬁrms’ locational choices.
New economic geography (NEG) aims precisely at explaining how ﬁrms do interact to form clusters
within a few regions (Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2003). It is, therefore, natural to tackle
the process of ﬁscal competition by using the main ingredients of NEG, namely increasing returns,
market size, and imperfect competition.
This is the road taken recently in various papers (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van
Ypersele, 2005; Borck and Pﬂüger, 2006). However, very much like in NEG, they all have chosen to
focus on the product market. Yet, recent empirical contributions suggest that labor market pooling
is one of the main explanations for the existence of ﬁrms’ clusters (Dumais et al., 2002; Rosenthal
and Strange, 2004). The speciﬁcity of human capital being itself the main reason for imperfect
matching between ﬁrms and workers, we ﬁnd it natural to study how skill mismatch aﬀects the
spatial distribution of ﬁrms through both ﬁrms’ locational choices and the working of local labor
markets. When the labor force is heterogeneous in the skill space, ﬁrms are able to set wages below
the marginal productivity of labor by diﬀerentiating technologies. Hence, they operate on imperfectly
competitive labor markets. As ﬁrms also exhibit scale economies at the plant level, it appears that
our setting blends the main ingredients of NEG. However, we obtain results that are very diﬀerent
from existing ones.
First, we show that the large country’s residents enjoy a higher utility level than do those of the
small country. Yet, though the large country has more ﬁrms than does the small one, competition on
2local labor markets hinders the large country to have a more than proportionate share of ﬁrms. We
thus get a reverse home market eﬀect: t h es h a r eo fﬁrms in the larger region is less than the share of
consumers in that region. Put together, the last two results mean that our model encapsulates both
the “importance of being small” and the “importance of being large”, two aspects that have been
emphasized in distinct papers.
Second, the few existing studies focussing on tax competition between asymmetric countries
predict that the large country sets a higher corporate tax rate than does the small one (Bucovetsky,
1991; Wilson, 1991; Hauﬂer and Wooton, 1999; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005). This prediction
does not necessarily ﬁt well the real world, however. In their analysis of the eﬀective corporate tax
rates set in several OECD countries, Devereux et al. (2002) report much more mixed results. For
example, their Figure 7 reveals that, if the eﬀective average tax rates in Germany, Japan, and the
United States are higher than those set in Austria, Finland and Sweden, those prevailing in Belgium
and Greece are higher than those in France and the United Kingdom. There is, therefore, a need for
ad i ﬀerent approach.
This is what we accomplish in this paper where we show that the small country levies higher
corporate tax rate than does the large country, the reason being that the small country enjoys a
reverse home market eﬀect that allows it to follow a more aggressive tax policy. Hence, by focussing
on the microeconomic underpinnings of local labor markets, we are able to establish that the main
implication of the above-mentioned studies is reversed. Such a prediction seems to ﬁtw e l lw h a tw e
observe in the European Union. To see it, consider the six founding EU-members (Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), the economies of which are fairly well integrated.
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationship between the share of corporate taxes in total tax receipts and,
respectively, these countries’ GDP and population size. Clearly, both relationships are downward
sloping and correlations between variables are very high.1
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
1Considering the EU-15 also leads to decreasing relationships. However, the correlation values are lower.
3Third, our analysis has three major redistributional implications. The ﬁrst one is that tax compe-
tition leads to redistribution from the large to the small country. This is due to the fact that, because
of the reverse home market eﬀect, the small country is able to tax both domestic and foreign capital.
However, the large country always reaches a higher utility level than does the small country. This
sharply diﬀers from the result obtained in the existing studies where the small country typically at-
tains higher utility under tax competition (Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991). The next implication is
that tax competition reduces international inequalities in the sense that the large country’s residents
prefer the no-tax outcome, whereas those of the small country are better oﬀ under tax competition.
The ﬁnal implication is that tax harmonization leads to redistribution from the large to the small
country. In other words, countries are bound to disagree on the need to allow for tax competition as
well as on the choice of a common tax rate.
Our last contribution is methodological in nature. Even in the case of simple games such as those
by Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), showing the existence of a (pure-strategy)
Nash equilibrium in tax games is known to be a very problematic issue.2 Here, we propose a new
approach to show that our tax game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It is worth stressing that this is
done without imposing ad hoc restrictions. This in turn allows us to compare the ﬁscal competition
outcome to both the autarky and no-tax cases on solid grounds, unlike many existing contributions.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. In
section 3, we study the international distribution of capital in the no-tax case, whereas the process of
ﬁscal competition is discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes by discussing extensions and policy
implications.
2So far, the existence of a Nash equilibrium has been proven only in special cases. For example, Laussel and Le
Breton (1998) simplify the tax game by ignoring consumers’ capital income, whereas Bucovetsky (2003) shows the
existence of a Nash equilibrium in a tax game with a continuum of countries. Peralta and van Ypersele (2006) show
that a tax competition model with a quadratic production function and a perfectly competitive markets has a Nash
equilibrium.
42 The model and preliminary results
Consider an economy formed by two countries, labeled 1 and 2, and a total mass L of consumers.
There are two production factors, labor and capital. National capital endowments are evenly owned
by local workers, who inelastically supply one unit of labor each. The unit of capital is chosen for each
worker to own a single unit of capital. Our modeling strategy thus abstracts from redistributional
issues between capital-owners and workers. Because most FDI takes place in countries with similar
technologies and factor endowments (think of the OECD countries), we abstract from comparative
advantage of both the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin types. However, although many models of
ﬁscal competition assume that competing jurisdictions have the same size, countries involved in FDI
often diﬀer in terms of market sizes. Let θ ∈ (0,1) denote the share of consumers in country 1,w h i c h
implies that θ also measures that country’s shares of labor and capital. Let l1 = θL and l2 =( 1−θ)L
denote the mass of consumers in countries 1 and 2, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume
that l1 ≥ l2. Throughout this paper, we refer to θ and to (1 − θ) as being the size of countries 1
and 2. Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider asymmetric countries with θ > 1/2,t h u si m p l y i n g
that country 1 (2) is the large (small) country. Consumers are immobile and can supply labor only
in the country in which they reside, so that labor markets are local. By contrast, consumers are free
to supply capital wherever they want.
2.1 Firm technology and labor market friction
The industry is formed by heterogeneous ﬁrms that supply a homogeneous good sold in each country
on a competitive market. This good can be shipped at zero cost between the two countries so that
the law of one price holds; we take it as the numéraire. In other words, product market conditions
do not inﬂuence ﬁrms’ locational choices. This somewhat extreme assumption is made to capture
the idea that economic integration weakens the relative inﬂuence of product market competition on
ﬁrms’ location, whereas it exacerbates the eﬀect of costs diﬀerences of immobile factors. It is worth
stressing, however, that introducing positive transport costs for the ﬁnal good does not change our
5main results provided that these costs are suﬃciently low.3
Each ﬁrm has a single plant that uses both capital and labor as inputs; its cost function is given
by C(q)=fr+ cwq,w h e r ef is the ﬁxed requirement of capital and c the marginal requirement
of labor; r and w are the rate of return of capital and the wage rate, which are both endogenous.
To ease the burden of notation, we normalize both f and c to one. At this stage, one may wonder
if our assumption of a perfectly competitive product market is compatible with that of increasing
returns at the ﬁrm level. As we will see later, we consider imperfect competition on the labor market
in which ﬁrms pay wages lower than the marginal productivity of labor. Thus, ﬁrms make positive
operating proﬁts that allow them to cover their payment for their ﬁxed requirement of capital.
Each ﬁrm uses a speciﬁc technology in the sense that workers can produce only when they
perfectly match the ﬁrm’s skill needs. Workers have a priori heterogeneous skills, so that they have
diﬀerent matches with a ﬁrm’s job oﬀer. Thus, if ﬁrm k hires a worker whose skill diﬀers from xk,
the worker must get trained and her cost of training to meet the ﬁrm’s skill requirement is a function
of the diﬀerence between the worker’s skill x and the ﬁrm k’s skill requirement xk.
In describing the heterogeneity of workers, we follow Kim (1989) and others by assuming that
the skill space is described by the circumference C of a circle. As our main focus is about the impact
of country size on the international distribution of capital under diﬀerent scenarios, we also assume
that the two countries have the same skill space; we normalize the length of C to one. Individuals’
skills are continuously and uniformly distributed along this circumference; the density is constant in
country i and denoted by li. Hence, the value of li measures the size of the local labor market.
There are ni ﬁrms in country i,w i t hn1 +n2 = L. Firms’ job requirements xk are equally spaced
along the circumference C so that 1/ni is the distance between two adjacent ﬁrms in the skill space.
The training cost function is β |x − xk|,w h e r eβ expresses the ability of a worker to learn how to
adjust to a technology diﬀerent from her skill. After training, all workers are identical from the ﬁrm’s
viewpoint since their ex post productivity is observable and equal to 1 by normalization (thus, there
is no moral hazard problem within ﬁrms).
3This is because the inequalities shown below remain true. We will examine this issue later on.
6We assume that ﬁrms are not able to observe each worker’s skill type, perhaps because both
labor markets are thick.4 Firms know only the distribution of x. However, workers know their own
types and observe the ﬁrms’ skill needs. In order to induce the appropriate set of workers to take
jobs with the most suitable ﬁrm, workers must therefore pay at least some part of the training cost.
In addition, since the supply of a worker is inelastic, ﬁrms cannot oﬀer a wage menu so that the
worker must pay for all the costs of training, which are not observable to the ﬁrm (hence resolving
the adverse selection problem). Consequently, workers must pay their entire training costs, whereas
each ﬁrm i oﬀers the same wage to all its workers, conditional on the worker having been trained to
the skill xi. Each worker then compares the wage oﬀers of ﬁrms and the required training costs; she
simply chooses to work for the ﬁrm oﬀering the highest wage net of training costs (Hamilton et al.,
2000).
Suppose that ﬁrm k is located in country i.W h e nﬁr m so ne a c hs i d eo fk oﬀer wages wi,k−1 and
wi,k+1, ﬁrm k’s labor pool consists of two subsegments whose outer boundaries are xi,k and xi,k+1.
The worker at xi,k receives the same net wage from ﬁrm k and ﬁrm k−1, whereas the worker at xi,k+1
receives the same net wage from ﬁrm k and ﬁrm k+1. Because ﬁrm k knows the training cost function
and all ﬁrms’ skill requirements, it can determine xi,k and xi,k+1 as the solutions to the two equations
wi,k−β |xi,k − xi,k| = wi,k−1−β |xi,k − xi,k−1| and wi,k−β |xi,k+1 − xi,k| = wi,k+1−β |xi,k+1 − xi,k+1|.
Hence, we have
xi,k =
wi,k−1 − wi,k + β(xi,k + xi,k−1)
2β
xi,k+1 =
wi,k − wi,k+1 + β(xi,k + xi,k+1)
2β
. (1)
We choose the unit of the homogeneous good for each worker to produce one unit of good. Firm
4When ﬁrms are able to observe worker’s skill type, our main results, especially those regarding the reverse home
market eﬀect, are likely to be the same. Indeed, ﬁrms have to bear the training costs, thus implying that it is less
proﬁtable for ﬁrms to enter the economy (Hamilton et al., 2000). Because the incentives to enter are the same in the
two countries, their relative attractiveness should be unaﬀected.




li(1 − wi,k)dx − ri
= li(1 − wi,k)(xi,k+1 − xi,k) − ri (2)
where ri is the price of capital and wi,k the wage ﬁrm k pays when it is located in country i.
In the rest of this section, we focus on our benchmark case in which capital is immobile. The
output being sold at the same price, the trade balance implies that each country consumes only its
own production. Accordingly, our benchmark case may be referred to as the autarky case. The
amount of capital available in country i being li, capital market clearing implies that the number of
ﬁrms in country i is ﬁx e da n dg i v e nb y
na
i = li (3)
where the superscript a stands for the autarky case. This in turn implies that the large country has
al a r g e rn u m b e ro fﬁr m st h a nd o e st h es m a l l( na
1 >n a
2).
2.2 Equilibrium factor prices
We ﬁrst determine the equilibrium values of wi,k.T h e t r a d e - o ﬀ that allows us to determine the
equilibrium wage is straightforward (see (4)). Everything else being equal, higher wages lead to lower
proﬁts because the wage bill rises. However, higher wages also foster higher proﬁts by attracting
more workers, hence yielding a larger output. These two eﬀects are balanced at the equilibrium wage
rate, which may be found by taking the ﬁrst-order condition for πi,k with respect to wi,k:
∂πi,k
∂wi,k









This wage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, which is symmetric (Hamilton et al., 2000). It then







which is positive as long as β < (1 − θ)L, a condition we assume to hold throughout the rest of
the paper. Thus, the equilibrium wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labor after training,
8minus a premium that local ﬁrms are able to levy because workers cannot move costlessly from one
ﬁrm to another. Note that this premium is required for each ﬁrm to be able to cover its (endogenous)
ﬁxed capital cost. As expected, it decreases as the number of ﬁrms located in country i rises because
ﬁrms have less monopsony power on the labor market.
Substituting w∗










All else the same, individual proﬁts decrease with the country size.
It remains to describe how the price of capital is determined. As usual, we assume that there is
free entry and exit in the industry. Consequently, competition for capital among entrepreneurs implies
that rental rates exactly absorb ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts, so that ri must be such that π∗
i,k =0 .T h i s

















As a larger country allows ﬁrms to earn lower operating proﬁts under autarky, the price of capital is
lower in the large country than in the small one.
We are now equipped to describe the two main eﬀects at work in our setting. On the one hand,
when the size li of a country increases, it becomes more proﬁtable to ﬁrms because a larger labor
pool allows them to hire more workers, whence to produce and sell more. We refer to that as the
market size eﬀect. On the other hand, a larger labor market also leads to more ﬁrms and, therefore,
to lower average training costs. This reduces the monopsony power of ﬁrms, thus implying that they
have to pay higher wages. We call this force the labor-market crowding eﬀect. Expressions (6) and
(8) show that the latter eﬀect always dominates the former when there is autarky.
The indirect utility of an individual of skill type x working for ﬁrm k in country i is given by
Vi,k(x)=w∗
i − β |x − xi,k| + r∗
i (9)









Individual utilities being quasi-linear, we may add them up to deﬁne the social surplus. Then,





































i ≡ Vi. (10)
In this expression, the second term represents the eﬀect of improving the quality match. When the
number of local ﬁrms rises, the average mismatch decreases, implying that the equilibrium wage
i n c r e a s e s .H o w e v e r ,a ss h o w nb y( 7 ) ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms also leads to a lower capital
price. Thus, the total impact of the number of ﬁrms on welfare is a priori ambiguous.
Under autarky, it follows from (3), (8) and (10) that
V a














































Hence, the large country’s residents are better oﬀ than those of the small country. Note that this
welfare gap is a reﬂection of the presence of aggregate increasing returns. Furthermore, the welfare
gap rises as the share of the large country in the global economy increases since
d2(V a
1 − V a
2 )
dθ2 > 0.
Summarizing the foregoing discussion, we have:
10Proposition 1 When capital is immobile, consumers reach a higher utility level in the large country.
Furthermore, the larger the diﬀerence in size, the larger the gap in individual welfare levels between
the two countries.
3 Capital mobility
In this section, we allow for capital mobility so that the number of ﬁrms located in a country is
no longer tied to the amount of local capital. A spatial equilibrium is such that no agent has an
incentive to change her international allocation of capital and such that no ﬁrm has an incentive to
enter or exit the market. These two conditions will hold when no agent can get a higher rental rate
by relocating her capital and when rental rates exactly absorb ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts. A spatial
equilibrium is the outcome of the following two opposite forces: the market size eﬀect has the nature
of an attraction force, whereas the labor-market crowding eﬀe c ta c t sa sarepulsion force. In what
follows, we restrict our analysis to the meaningful case of interior spatial equilibria only.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that the number of ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently large to
avoid the integer problem; we thus treat ni as a positive real number.
3.1 The free market outcome
When capital is mobile, it ﬂows to the country with higher capital price and arbitrage induces the















2 if and only if l1 >l 2,w h e r e a sl1 = l2 implies that n∗
1 = n∗
2. Because n1 + n2 = L,









5Note that national wages may diﬀer because labor is spatially immobile.
11where the superscript m stands for the case of mobile capital.
Using l1 = θL and l2 =( 1− θ)L, the corresponding value of the price of capital is then obtained









which is a decreasing and concave function of θ over the interval (1/2,1). In other words, increasing
the relative size of the large country decreases the interest rate at a decreasing rate.
As expected, once the two countries have diﬀerent sizes, the mobility of capital generates a
distribution of ﬁrms that diﬀers from the one arising under autarky. A key-question is whether the







Thus, capital is exported from the large country to the small country. This implies that capital
mobility between asymmetric countries leads to a more dispersed international allocation of capital.
This should not come as a surprise since, under autarky, the price of capital is higher in the small
country than in the large one.
Yet, the large country retains a larger number of ﬁrms than the small one, nm
1 >n m
2 .T h i s i s
because the equalization of proﬁts between countries implies that the market size eﬀect generated
by the large country has to be exactly oﬀset by a stronger labor-market crowding eﬀect. For that,
it must be that the large country hosts more ﬁrms than the small country. Putting all these results






We now want to determine whether the equilibrium outcome exhibits a “home market eﬀect”.
According to Helpman and Krugman (1985), when the industry is characterized by scale economies at
the ﬁrm level and imperfect competition, the large country would attract a more than proportionate
share of ﬁrms. Deﬁne the share of ﬁrms in country 1 as λ = nm


























because θ > 1−θ, where the equality holds if and only if θ =1 /2. Thus, unless the two countries have
the same size, the large country hosts a less than proportionate share of the industry, thus running
against what has been called the “pervasiveness” of the home market eﬀect (Head et al., 2002).
To understand the main forces at work, consider the following thought experiment. Under au-
tarky, (2) implies that ﬁrms located in the large country enjoy higher proﬁts gross of ﬁxed cost than
ﬁrms set up in the small one. Assume now that capital becomes mobile but that wages remain ﬁxed
in both countries. The gross proﬁtd i ﬀerential thus triggers a ﬂow of capital from the small country
to the large one. As a result, the share of ﬁrms installed in the large country exceeds its share of
capital. In other words, other things the same, the large market would attract a more than propor-
tionate share of the industry. However, when more (less) ﬁrms set up in the large (small) country,
wages are not constant. They increase in the large country due to the labor-market crowding eﬀect
and decrease in the small one. Our result shows that this eﬀect is suﬃciently strong to overcome
t h em a r k e ts i z ee ﬀect, thus giving rise to what we may call a “reverse home market eﬀect” (in short
RHME).6
Several comments are in order. First, our result cannot be dismissed on the grounds that we have
assumed zero transport cost for ﬁrms’ output. Indeed, everything hold true when such costs are
positive but not too high. This is because the foregoing inequalities are strict and will remain valid in
the presence of a small price wedge on the homogenous good market. Stated diﬀerently, combining
scale economies, imperfect competition and transport costs may well yield a RHME.
6Formally, as shown by (11), the market size eﬀect is proportional to the number of ﬁrms, whereas the labor-market
crowding eﬀect is proportional to the square of the number of ﬁrms. This makes the large country relatively less
attractive to ﬁrms. Clearly, this argument depends on the fact that our model is linear. For the same reason, we may
conjecture that the results derived here are robust against alternative speciﬁcations that are not too nonlinear.
13Second, we want to stress the fact that the home market eﬀect is typically derived in settings in
which wages are ﬁxed and determined in another sector operating under constant returns and perfect
competition (Head et al., 2002). In such a context, the market size eﬀect is the only one at work,
thus entailing a more than proportionate share of ﬁrms in the large country. However, frictions on
the labor market may overcome this eﬀect. They are, therefore, likely to play an important role in
the determination of the industry structure and the eﬀects of the liberalization of capital movements.
In particular, we may expect imperfect matching on the labor market could slow down the possible
agglomeration of ﬁrms in a few regions, at least when workers are spatially immobile.7
Third, it is hard to believe that such a diﬀerence in results is due to the sole existence of strategic
interactions in our setting. Indeed, as shown by Head et al. (2002), strategic competition on the prod-
uct market does not invalidate the home market eﬀect. Instead, this suggests that, under imperfect
competition, product-market and input-market analyses need not lead to similar conclusions.
Last, the foregoing result sheds light on the fact that the evidence regarding the presence of
t h eh o m em a r k e te ﬀect in real-world data is described as being “highly mixed” by Head and Mayer
(2004, p.2642) in their survey of the empirical literature. In this perspective, our result is potentially
important because there is ample evidence that labor market frictions are pervasive, whether home
market eﬀects are or not (Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003).
O u rm a i nr e s u l t sm a yb es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s .
Proposition 2 When capital is mobile, the large country accommodates more ﬁrms than the small
country, but its industry share is less than its capital share.
Furthermore, it is readily veriﬁed that dλ/dθ < 1 over a large interval of θ-values, which implies
that the gap θ−λ expands. In this case, increasing the relative size of the large country exacerbates
7Amiti and Pissarides [1] consider labor heterogeneity in a monopolistic competition model of trade. However, their
setting is diﬀerent from ours along the following lines: (i) ﬁrms can observe workers’ skill characteristics and, whence,
discriminate workers with respect to wage payment; (ii) there is inter-sectoral mobility of workers. Amiti and Pissarides
then show that these two assumptions lead ﬁrms to pay a constant average wage to skilled workers. This prevents the
emergence of a labor-market crowding eﬀect.
14the RHME. However, when θ becomes very large (& 0.893), the gap θ−λ shrinks, thus showing that
the RHME is not necessarily magniﬁed by the market size eﬀect.
Finally, as the small country imports capital, both countries face diﬀerent incentives to tax ﬁrms.
We will see in section 4 how this is reﬂected in the tax outcome.
3.2 The welfare implications of capital mobility
The equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms minimizes total training costs in the global economy. Indeed,















The ﬁrst order condition for the minimization of T with respect to n1 and n2,t a k i n gn1 + n2 =
L into account, yields (11). Note that the net output of the global economy is L − T(n1,n 2).
Hence, the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms maximizes the net output of the global economy. Thus,
despite imperfect competition on local labor markets, the international allocation of capital is globally
eﬃcient under free mobility, as in standard neoclassical models. However, it generates redistributive
eﬀects between the two countries.
To see how, we compare the welfare levels reached in each country at the market outcome with
and without capital mobility. From r1 = r2 and (12), the utility diﬀerence across countries in the
mobile capital case is given by
V m





















as long as θ > 1/2. Such a welfare gap ﬁnds its origin in the fact that the large country has a larger
number of ﬁrms, which implies higher wages and lower training costs (see (5) and (10)). Furthermore,
it also rises as the size discrepancy increases.
15Turning to comparisons of welfare under mobility and autarky, standard calculations show that
V m







































As θ > 1/2 and, hence, l1 >l 2, this implies that
V m
1 − V a
1 > 0.
Hence, the large country always gains from capital mobility. Though intuitive, this result is not totally
immediate. Indeed, country 1’s residents get higher capital incomes because its price rises when it
can be invested abroad, but they earn lower wages because the number of local ﬁrms is lower.





l2 > 0, it turns out that V m
2 − V a
2 > 0 holds if and only if









This is a second degree inequality that is satisﬁed on the unit interval if and only if θ > θc ≡
(5 +
√
7)/8 > 1/2. Thus, we have:
Proposition 3 Compared to the autarky case, capital mobility always raises the utility level in the
large country. However, the utility level in the small country increases if and only if countries have
very diﬀerent sizes.
This may be understood as follows. When capital is mobile, the global output net of training costs
increases and reaches its maximum at the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms. However, these gains
need not beneﬁt each country as some ﬁrms move to the small country. In the large country, capital
income rises but its labor income falls, whereas these two eﬀe c t sg oi nt h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o ni nt h e
small country. In the large country, the gains resulting from the higher price of capital for country
1’s residents always more than compensate their wage decrease. This is because the large country
hosts more ﬁrms than the small one, thus making the marginal impact of the labor-market crowding
eﬀect weak enough because labor markets are local, whereas the marginal impact of the capital price
16remains strong enough because the capital market is fully integrated. In the small country, consumers
earn higher wages under capital mobility than under autarky (see Figure 3). Whether these gains
are large enough to compensate for the lower price of capital now depends on the relative size of the
two countries. As the large country gets bigger and bigger, the wage level in the small country goes
down, but its decrease is sharper under autarky than under capital mobility. Consequently, when θ is
suﬃciently large, the gains in wage income may compensate the loss in capital income. By contrast,
when country sizes are similar, such a compensation is no longer possible. This shows that country
size matters in the sense that capital mobility may exacerbate international inequalities.
Insert Figure 3 about here
4 Capital taxation
In this section, we study the eﬀects of tax competition on the location of ﬁrms. Because our main focus
is on the impact of ﬁscal competition on the location of ﬁrms, we disregard the possible ineﬃciency
of public goods provision and assume that national governments tax capital to make their residents
better oﬀ. More precisely, we consider two national governments that maximize the welfare of their
residents. Following a well-established tradition in ﬁscal competition (Cremer and Pestieau, 2004),
we assume a per-unit capital tax. It is the only instrument available to each government, which
redistributes the proceeds to their residents. In addition, each government is subject to a budget-
balance constraint.
We consider a two-stage game in which national governments, ﬁrst, choose simultaneously their
tax level and, then, ﬁrms enter the market, decide where to locate and pay the corresponding wage.
From now on, we will refer to the ﬁrst stage game as the tax game. The equilibrium concept we
adopt is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction.
174.1 The tax game
Let ti denote the per-unit capital tax rate in country i and si the transfer to the residents of this










+ ri + si. (15)
Consider the second stage subgame induced by si and ti (i =1 ,2). The capital price in each
















Given n1+n2 = L,i ti sr e a d i l yv e r i ﬁed that this equation has a single solution n∗
1(t1,t 2) and n∗
2(t1,t 2).
The implicit function theorem implies that these two functions are continuous with respect to t1 and
t2. To ease the burden of notation, we denote these functions n1 and n2.
Let us now focus on the tax game. Country i’s government, which fully anticipates the inﬂuence
of its decision on the resulting distribution of ﬁrms determined by (17), maximizes (15) with respect
to si and ti under the budget constraint
sili = tini.












which is a continuous function of ti and tj. Substituting nj = L − ni into (17), we get
8Note that the tax and transfer may be negative (ti < 0 and si < 0), thus meaning that government i may decide







(L − ni)2 + tj =0 (19)
which is a continuous function of ti and tj. Thus, the welfare problem of government i is modeled as
a game in which this government maximizes (18) with respect to ti, subject to the constraint (19).
































A similar argument holds for country j 6= i.F r o mn1 + n2 = L = l1 + l2, it follows that
li − ni = nj − lj. (22)




























Because (23) encapsulates both the equilibrium conditions of each government and the constraint
(19), a Nash equilibrium (t∗
1,t ∗
2) of the tax game (if any) must satisfy (23) where n1 + n2 = L.
The following result is shown in Appendix A.
Proposition 4 The tax game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Having done that, we ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms at the tax equilibrium
(the proof is given in Appendix B).
Proposition 5 The large country has more ﬁrms at the tax-game outcome than at the no-tax out-
come, but the reverse home market eﬀect is still present.
19Thus, tax competition weakens the RHME generated by the market forces.I n o t h e r w o r d s , i f
tax competition aﬀects the international distribution of capital, it does not change its structural



















where the superscript g represents the capital mobile case with active national governments.
























Combining (26) with (21), we then obtain our ﬁrst result about tax rates:
t∗
2 > 0.
Moreover, it follows from (25) that 7/8 − l1/n
g
1 > 7/8 − l2/n
g




























So far, we do not know whether or not t∗
1 is positive. The following numerical example, in which
L =1and β =0 .1,s u ﬃces to show that country 1 may choose to tax or to subsidy capital according
to its relative size. Indeed, we see from Figure 4 that the tax rate decreases and that taxation is
replaced by subvention once θ exceeds 0.84 < 0.893 < 0.9.9 The RHME being exacerbated over the
interval [0.5,0.893],c o u n t r y1 reacts by subsidizing capital.
9Thus, the condition β < (1 − θ)L is satisﬁed.
20Insert Figure 4 about here
We may summarize our results as follows.
Proposition 6 At the tax-game outcome, the government of the small country always taxes ﬁrms.
However, the government of the large country either subsidies or taxes ﬁrms. When it taxes ﬁrms,
its tax level is always lower than the one chosen by the government of the small country.
One can think of this result as follows. At the no-tax outcome, the large country exports capital
and is, therefore, less induced to tax it because the subsidy each of its workers gets is s1 = t1n1/l1 <t 1.
The reverse holds in the small country where s2 = t2n2/l2 >t 2, thus implying that the it has more
incentives to tax capital. This eﬀect is in turn reinforced by the fact that wages increase in the capital
exporting country and decrease in the capital importing one. The same holds when the RHME is
still present at the tax outcome, which is precisely what we have shown above. In game-theoretic
terms, our result may be explained by means of best reply functions. Numerical simulations indicate
that the best reply of the large country is upward slopping: when the small country raises its tax
rate, the large one capitalizes on the market size eﬀect to follow suit. By contrast, the best reply
of the small country is downward slopping. Whenever the large country decreases its tax rate, the
small country may aﬀord to increase its own rate because of the RHME. In other words, the fact
that the small country imports capital at the no-tax outcome allows it to build on this comparative
advantage to design a more aggressive tax policy that balances the marginal gain of a tax rise and
the marginal cost of losing ﬁrms.
The foregoing proposition is to be contrasted to t h o s eo b t a i n e di nm o d e l sw i t hi m p e r f e c tc o m p e -
tition in the product market (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck
and Pﬂüger, 2006). All these papers assume two countries competing for monopolistic competitive
ﬁrms in which the large country is relatively more attractive than the small one. Accordingly, the
small country must oﬀer a lower tax rate than does the large country in order to counterbalance
the comparative advantage of the large country. It is worth stressing that such a result hinges on
21t h ep r e s e n c eo fah o m em a r k e te ﬀect. In our model, the labor-market crowding eﬀect dominates the
market size eﬀect, thus making the large country relatively less attractive than the small one. This
in turn allows the small country to set a higher tax rate than the large country.
4.2 Tax competition versus tax coordination
It remains to compare the welfare level reached in each country at the tax-competition and no-tax
(eﬃcient) outcomes. Consider, ﬁrst, the case of cooperation between governments. Using (18) and




(l1V1 + l2V2)=L − T(n1,n 2).
As seen in the previous section, T is minimized in the no-tax case. Consequently, cooperation leads
to the same outcome as in the no-tax case.






which means that , under tax competition, the large country’s residents attains higher utility than
do the small country’s residents. Moreover, we also show in Appendix C that
V
g
2 − V m
2 > 0.
As the allocation of capital ceases to be eﬃcient under tax competition, it must be that
V
g
1 − V m
1 < 0.
Our results may then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 7 Under tax competition, the large country’s residents are always better oﬀ than the
small country’s residents. Yet, the large country’s residents are always better oﬀ at the no-tax out-
come, whereas the small country’s residents prefer the tax-game outcome.
Despite the RHME, in the absence of tax competition, the inhabitants of the large country are
always better oﬀ than those of the small one (Proposition 1). Tax competition reduces this welfare
22gap by allowing the small country to implement a more generous redistribution policy, which relies
itself on the RHME generated by the labor-market crowding eﬀect (Proposition 2). However, the
small country still preserves part of its attractiveness by not overshooting.
Again, country size matters in the sense that ﬁscal competition reduces international inequalities
once it is recognized that the location of ﬁrms is more driven by labor market than product market
considerations. This conﬁrms what we have seen in the foregoing, namely the existing contributions
that point to the advantage of being large in tax competition rests on the home market eﬀect. By
contrast, our setting uncovers the advantage being small in a framework involving increasing returns
and labor market friction, two pervasive features of modern economies.
It remains to consider the eﬀect of tax harmonization, that is, the two countries set the same
tax rate t on capital. Because (17) is reduced to (11), the distribution of ﬁr m si st h es a m ea si n
the free market outcome. Therefore, there is no distortion in the sense that the net global output
is maximized. This is not the end of the story, however. Indeed, it follows from (18) that tax
harmonization has redistributional eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, a resident of country i gains (or loses) from









Expressions (25) and (26) then imply that ∆1 < 0 and ∆2 > 0. Consequently, we have:
Proposition 8 A move from tax competition to tax harmonization leads to income redistribution
from the large to the small country.
As expected, under tax harmonization, the large country loses ﬁrms and income. However,
because the net global output is maximized, this implies that the small country gains from tax har-
monization. Again, this points to the existence of conﬂicting interests between countries of diﬀerent
sizes when they have to agree about the possible harmonization of capital taxation.
235C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have obtained new results in tax competition in an otherwise standard model, which goes back
at least to Salop (1979). Whereas the large country has more ﬁrms per capita than does the small
country both under tax competition and tax cooperation in Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), we
have seen that the large country always exports capital toward the small one. This is because we
have a RHME, whereas the home market eﬀect holds in Ottaviano and van Ypersele. This shows
that the way ﬁrms choose their location is crucial in assessing the merits of tax competition. Stated
diﬀerently, uncovering the various mechanisms that drive the mobility of ﬁr m sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e si s
needed to understand the possible implications of ﬁscal competition.
An interesting implication of our framework is to shed light on the fact that ﬁscal competition
might well trigger unemployment in a country. To see it, consider an economic environment in
which some workers might not take a job, the setting being otherwise similar to the one described
above. Speciﬁcally, we assume that workers get the same level of unemployment beneﬁt b>0 when
unemployed. This implies that a worker supplies labor provided that her wage net of training costs
is greater than or equal to b. Thisse and Zenou (2000) then show that the labor market equilibrium
involves unemployment in country i when 1 <b+ β/ni holds, namely when the number of ﬁrms
l o c a t e di nt h i sc o u n t r yi ss u ﬃciently small. In this case, the most distant workers on the skill circle
refrain from working, thus implying that each ﬁrm acts as a monopsony in the labor market. Thus,
capital mobility could foster unemployment in the large country that now has a smaller number of
ﬁrms, thus qualifying Proposition 3. On the other hand, as ﬁscal competition leads to a reduction
in the number of ﬁrms installed in the small country when compared to the no-tax case, it is now
the small country that could experience unemployment at the taxation outcome, thus qualifying
Proposition 7.
At least three possible extensions are worth mentioning. First, countries could use the tax
proceeds to subsidize workers’ training. In such a context, training costs would become lower and
wages higher. However, lower training costs would make the corresponding country less attractive
by reducing ﬁrms’ market power on the labor market. The following question thus suggests itself:
24to which extent does one country subsidy its labor force more than the other, and get a better
trained labor force, according to its size? Second, introducing capital accumulation with the aim of
studying the relationship between economic growth and skill mismatch appears to be a fairly natural
topic to investigate. Last, some empirical evidence suggests that several countries tax discriminate
between local and foreign ﬁrms instead of applying the same tax rate as in this paper (Huizinga and
Nicodème, 2005). It would be interesting to revisit our model when national governments may use
such additional instruments. These topics are left for future investigation.
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28Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof involves four steps.
Step 1. The condition (23) has a unique solution
Substituting n2 = L−n1 into (23), we see that both the left hand side (LHS) and the right hand
side (RHS) of (23) depend on n1. The LHS is negative and increases in n1 in the interval (0,8l1/7),a n d
is positive in (8l1/7,L]. Moreover, it is readily veriﬁed that limn1→0 LHS = −∞ and LHS|n1=8l1/7 =
0. The RHS is positive in [0,L− 8l2/7), and is negative and decreasing in n1 in (L − 8l2/7,L).W e
also have RHS|n1=L−8l2/7 =0and limn1→L RHS = −∞.B e c a u s e8l1/7−(L − 8l2/7) = L/7 > 0,i t
is readily veriﬁed that there exists a unique n1 that satisﬁes (23). Combining this with (21) shows
that there exists a unique point (n∗
1,t ∗
1,t ∗
2) for which both the ﬁrst-order conditions dV1/dt1 =0
and dV2/dt2 =0and the equalization of capital prices (19) hold. Note also that this equilibrium
(if it exists) is such that n∗
i > 0 for i =1 ,2. Hence, the tax game has at most one interior Nash
equilibrium.
Step 2. The function Vi(ti,t ∗
j) is quasi-concave w.r.t. ti
For that, we show that the second-order condition is always satisﬁed at any point for which both
the ﬁrst-order conditions of the two countries (dV1/dt1 =0and dV2/dt2 =0 ) and the equalization of
capital prices (19) hold. In doing so, we use the facts that conditions (24), (25), (26) and (27) must
hold at any solution to (23), which will be shown in Appendix B.































































































29Using (A1) and (A2), d2Vi/dt2























































































































































3 < 0. (A3)











which, combined with (26), implies that
Ψ1 > 0. (A5)

































3 < 0. (A6)
Similarly, (A4) and (26) lead to
Ψ2 > 0. (A7)





so that the second-order condition is satisﬁed for each i =1 ,2. Because Step 1 has shown that there
exists a unique t∗
i that satisﬁes dVi/dti =0for given t∗
j, Vi(ti,t ∗
j) is quasi-concave w.r.t. ti.
Step 3. The behavior of dVi/dti when ti → ±∞
For t∗







2 + ti − t∗
j
that ni is a continuously diﬀerentiable function of ti ∈ (−∞,∞). Furthermore, it follows immediately
from this equation that (i) limti→∞ ni =0 ,( i i )limti→∞ tin3
i =0 , (iii) limti→−∞ ni = L,a n d( i v )
limti→−∞ ti(L − ni)3 =0 .












































































− 1 > 0.






































31These two conditions together with Step 2 implies that Vi(ti,t ∗




2) is a Nash equilibrium of the tax game.
Step 4. Corner solutions
It remains to consider the cases of corner solutions in which one country has no ﬁrms (ni =0 ).
Two cases may arise. In the former, a country sets a tax rate suﬃciently high for all the ﬁrms to be
established in the other country. Clearly, such a strategy is never optimal from this country’s point
of view. In the latter, a country gives a suﬃciently high subsidy to attract all ﬁrms. Again, this
cannot happen in equilibrium because the other government would reduce its tax rate. Thus, (t∗
1,t ∗
2)
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the tax game. Q.E.D.
A p p e n d i xB .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5





































Step 1 in Appendix A implies that L − 8l2/7 <n
g
1 <L<8l1/7. This and n2 = L − n1 imply that
7/8 − li/n
g

















Now assume that γ ≥ 1. This implies that 7/8 − l1/n
g
1 ≥ 7/8 − l2/n
g









1/l1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be true that γ < 1. This means 7/8 − l2/n
g
2 > 7/8 − l1/n
g


























































1. N o t eh e r et h a tθ = l1/L,






⇔ θ > λ.( B 8 )
The proposition then follows from (B4), (B6), (B7) and (B8). Q.E.D.
Appendix C. Comparison of welfare levels

















































































































where the second equality follows from (17). Because nm
1 >n m











1 > 0. Moreover, (21) and (26) imply that βl1/(n
g
1)







33(ii) Substituting (21) into (18), we also have
V
g









































Since (26) gives l2/n
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As a result, we obtain
V
g










































2 and (26) imply that V
g
2 − V m
2 > 0 if 5β/4 − βl2 (1/n
g
2 +1 /nm




and (26) give that 1 <n
g
2/l2 <n m




























2 − V m
2 > 0.
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Figure 1: The relationship between the share of corporate taxes in total tax 
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Figure 2: The relationship between the share of corporate taxes in total tax 




































































































Figure 5: Nash equilibrium 
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